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Games, information, and politics applying game theoretic models to political science

Gates, Scott. ;Humes, Brian D.

Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press c1997

Online access

  • Title:
    Games, information, and politics applying game theoretic models to political science
  • Author/Creator: Gates, Scott.
  • Humes, Brian D.
  • Publisher: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press
  • Creation Date: c1997
  • Language: English
  • Physical Description: 1 online resource (193 p.).
  • Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references and index.
    Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-176) and index.
  • Subjects: Game theory; Political science -- Mathematical models
  • Description: Explains how game theory can be used to explain political phenomena
  • Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index.
    Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-176) and index.
  • Contents: Contents; Preface; 1. Modeling with Games; 2. A Brief Introduction to Game Theoretic Models; 3. Strategic Choice and Progressive Ambition in American Politics: An Examination of Rohde's Model; 4. Dynamic Games and the Politics of International Trade: An Examination of Coneybeare's Trade Wars; 5. Information and Transitions to Democracy: An Examination of Przeworski's Democracy and the Market; 6. Commitment, Bluffs, and Reputation; 7. Conclusion; References; Index
    Ch. 1. Modeling with Games
    Ch. 2. A Brief Introduction to Game Theoretic Models
    Ch. 3. Strategic Choice and Progressive Ambition in American Politics: An Examination of Rohde's Model
    Ch. 4. Dynamic Games and the Politics of International Trade: An Examination of Coneybeare's Trade Wars
    Ch. 5. Information and Transitions to Democracy: An Examination of Przeworski's Democracy and the Market
    Ch. 6. Commitment, Bluffs, and Reputation
    Ch. 7. Conclusion.
  • OCLC Number: 923503590
    669492927
  • Identifier: ISBN1-282-76567-1;ISBN9786612765674;ISBN0-472-02753-0